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Summary findings
Pritchett presents theory and calculations to show that  equalize these - and under many conditions, profit-
part of the explanation of slow growth in many poor  maximizing investors will do so. But there is ample
countries is not that governments did not spend on  reason not to believe that all governments act as profit-
investments, but that these investments did not create  maximizing investors - and ample reason to believe that
productive capital. For a variety of reasons, governments  some governments invest better than others.
take resources from current consumption to "invest" in  The implication, especially in developing countries, is
the economic equivalent of pyramids, items that produce  that a dollar's worth  of public investment spending often
no future output.  does not create a dollar's worth  of public capital. A
The most critical assumption (of the many) necessary  variety of calculations suggest that in a typical developing
for cumulated investment flows to be even reasonable  country less than 50 cents of capital were created for
proxies for capital stocks is that the cost of investment  each public dollar invested. One of the deep difficulties
(the p's) is equal to the value of the capital stock  of development may well be that even when public
evaluated as its increment to future profitability (the q's).  capital is productive it may be difficult to create this
This assumption can be justified only if investors act to  capital in the public sector.
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The Cost of Public Investment is not the Value of Public Capital'
Two metaphors  illustrate  the central problems  with the valuation  of public sector
capital.. The first is the tale of two country's steel mills. Both mills were built by parastatals
with government  backing with investments  of several billion dollars.  One mill is now a model
of efficiency  and a serious  competitor in world steel markets while the other has yet to produce
a single ton of steel.  Obviously  the value of the two steel mills is very different, yet according
to usual growth accounting  methods  the "capital" of these two firms is similar.
A second  metaphor has to do with types of investment. Compare  two types of
investments  that create fixed structures; building pyramids  and digging  canals.  Suppose  one
country invests only in canals, which increase  output, while in another country a tyrant
memorializes  himself by spending  the same amount on fixed structures, but builds only
pyramids. Again, if the government's "investments"  were added up over time the two
countries  would  have similar stocks of public sector "capital."
Imagine  that in the middle of either of these stories a researcher  stumbles  in and
proposes  to answer the question  of the productivity  of public  capital. The researcher  will
likely find that the average impact  of public sector investments  across countries  is quite small.
From this empirical finding  one might be tempted to recommend  that the public sector should
'  I would  like to thank  Bill Easterly,  Dcon Filmer,  Jonah Gelbach,  Aart Kray,  Ross
Levine,  Norman  Loayza,  Allison  Morantz.  Moshe  Syrquin,  Vinaya  Swaroop,  Mike Walton  and
the participants  at seminars  at the World  Bank and the Council  of Economic  Advisors  for useful
comments  and discussions.3
invest less since the productivity  of public capital is low.  This recommendation  is clearly not
correct.  But what went wrong methodologically?  The researcher  merely assumed  what every
other researcher  does; that investments  measured  at their cost, the price the investor  must pay
to attract the resources, create an equivalent  increase in the value of capital. But if the value
of the capital stock is defined as the increment  to future profitability,  then it is obvious that the
excess costs of steel mill construction  or investments  in pyramids  (irrespective  of their cost)
create no capital.
In order to make sensible  policy recommendations  about public investments  three
parameters  need to be identified:  the potential productivity  of public capital, the efficacy  of
public investments  in creating  public capital from resources invested,  and the expected
efficiency  of the public sector in operating  capital.  Policy discussions  about whether
governments  should 'do more" or 'do less" depend  not only on the potential  effect of
government  action in the abstract  but also on an assessment  of what any given government  will
actually do 2. Policy recommendations  clearly must differ across  countries, as a country with a
less effective  government  would have to have a higher productivity  of public  capital to justify
public investment  than another country with a more effective  public sector.
The first section of the paper formalizes  the metaphors.  The second  section gives
several  examples,  both positive  and negative, of ways in which actual governmental  behavior
2  The distinction  is often seen between  those researchers  that emphasize  the "market
failures"  or social inequities  that create  a potential  for a social welfare  maximizing  planner.  Some
argue  on the basis of a potential  welfare  improvement  by a hypothetical  welfare  maximizer  to an
proposal  for some  real action  by an actual government.  In contract,  other researchers  emphasize
the (pehaps  intrinsic)  failings  in how  governments  do in fact  behave.4
will determine  the efficacy of investment  in creating public (and private) capital. The third
section  uses micro evidence to estimate  how empirically important  this particular  effect might
be, and tries to draw the (empirically  difficult) distinction  between  public investment  that does
not really create public  capital and public  capital not effectively  used once created.  The fourth
section reinterprets the data on macroeconomic  growth, factor accumulation,  and total factor
productivity  to suggest  that as much as one half of investment  in some LDC regions was not
productive. The fifth section shows how this approach  to the question of the valuation  of
capital is useful by using it to interpret the existing empirical  results on public sector
investment  and discusses  policy recommendations  that flow from this approach.
i.  What is the value of the stock  of productive  capital?
The metaphors in the introduction  are contrived to illustrate  a critique of comparing
investment  spending  across countries that goes very deep.  Without specific  behavioral
assumptions  about the motivations  of investors  nothing can be inferred about the economic
productivity  of various types of investments  from existing data.  The problem of distinguishing
productive  (canals) versus non-productive  (pyramids)  investments  is not simple. Within every
government  sector there are both non-productive  investments  undertaken  for non-economic
reasons (pyramids)  and productive  investments  (canals).  Sectoral  examples are useful in
making  ideas concrete (but may only reveal my biases). For instance, within the  health  sector
there are expenditures  on basic public  health measures  (canals)  and there are chrome plated5
urban hospitals  (pyramids) 3, within education  there are primary schools (canals)  and there are
free universities  (pyramids). The critique goes even deeper than comparisons  of different
items within sectors as even within any sector expenditures  on exactly the same item, say,
roads, may link critical markets and be tremendously  productive  (canals)  or may lead nowhere
but the national leader's summer  palace (pyramids). Even real canals may be metaphorical
pyramids, as in many cases irrigation  projects are undertaken  in an excessively  capital
intensive  manner  that ignores local conditions  and allocation  mechanisms  of existing water and
have little or no payoff in increased  productivity  (pyramids)  while other real canals are
metaphorical  canals (Ostrom. 1995). The critique goes deeper still, because  even in building
the productive  canals (canals) various types of public  sector malfeasance  may lead to higher
than necessary  costs (partial pyramids).
A) The value of capital
The history of economic  thought  about "capital" is long and tortured and I am hoping
to duck most of the issues to make what is, I think, a simple point'. That point is that with the
usual, but very restrictive, assumptions  the cost of investment  and value of capital  created  by
3  When I say "public  health" I do not mean "primary  health care" I mean the provision  of
those  (few) health  services  which are public  goods.
'  In has long been recognized  that the idea of a single  aggregate  called "capital"  as a
determinant  of economic  outcomes  is problematic  as the value of capital  cannot  be defined
independently  of the structure  of relative  prices,  and in particular,  interest  rates. The Cambridge-
Cambridge  controversies  on the use of "capital" as a determinant  of the interest  rates being  the
perhaps  most famous  example  of the problems.6
that investment  will be equated  ex ante by profit maximizing  investors 5. However, when the
objective  function of an investor, such as a government,  is not profit maximization,  then there
is absolutely  no reason to expect the cost of those expenditures  classified as "investments"  and
the value of capital created by those expenditures  to coincide  even ex ante.
Say there are goods 1 to N in the economy  and time is indexed  by t up to T periods and
X is the (N by T) matrix which is the net consumption  of good n in period t (outputs  are
positive). In this set-up a capital good is a good which is an input into the production of other
goods and which is not fully exhausted  in a single period. The actual cost of creating the
capital good is the discounted  sum of the purchased  inputs. There are two points.  First, the
cost of a capital  good depends  only on past (the "P's" of the title) not future prices. Second,
this is actual cost, not economic  cost. Economic  cost is defined  as the minitnum  of possible
actual costs subject  to the technological  constraints that the inputs  can produce the output (line
2 of table 1). When I say "cost" I mean the cost, not the minimum  cost.
I It has long been well known  that cost of investment  and the value of capital are not
linked  ex post.  Among  the many  antecedents  of the distinguishing  the cost of investment  from
the value of capital is Hayek's The Pure Theory  of Capital  (1941).  He cites two very harmful
ideas to the theory  of capital,  one of which is:
that particular  capital  items represented  a definite  value,  independently  of the use
that could  be made  of them, a value which  was apparently  thought  to be
determined  by the amounts  'invested' in them. (p. 10).7
Table 1: Definitions  of cost and value of capital goods
_  Cost, the actual cost of  Ek=°  ot *  I X
creating the capital good  C(p, X  ,  K)  =  -k* -I,-
2  Economic Cost, the  EC(p, X  min  C(p,  X  IC)
minimum cost necessary  E
to create the capital  good.  s.t. g(  X,,  ...- ,X,l,)=X 1 ,t
Various concepts  of the valuation  of capital
3  "Constrained" value of  R
capital, the current net  CV(X  1r  X 1 ,, p)  =  o'*  R, (X,1r  X 1,  p)
present value of the
contribution  to output of
capital good XIT when
inputs  and outputs are X,
(not necessarily
optimizing)  valued  at
price p
4  "Market" value of max capital, the current  V(X1r  P) = X  CV(Xi  r  X ,, P)
maximal  net present
value of the contribution
of the capital good X, , to
output valued at p
5  "Optimal" value of
capital, the current  V(X,  P  )
maximal  net present
value of the contribution
of the capital good X, , to
output when prices are
set optimally  to p'
Notation:  X is an N (good)  by T (period) matrix of netputs.
What is the value of a capital good? I define the "market" value of the capital good as
its maximum  possible  (when inputs  and outputs are chosen optimally)  increment  to the net8
present value of future output (line 4). There are layers and layers in this definition, but three
points should be emphasized. First, the definition  of the value of capital depends  on
maximizing  behavior. Just as with costs, one could define the a constrained  value of capital as
the actual future increment to profits for a given set of inputs and outputs, where those inputs
are not necessarily  chosen optimally  (e.g. when parastatals  are over staffed, or requisite inputs
not available). This 'constrained value" of capital need not even be positive (say adding  a
machine  brings a requirement  to add 3,000 excess workers). While it is reasonable  to define
the value of capital as the maximized  value, in many cases the benefit flow from a given
capital stock will not be maximized,  particularly  by public sector entities. Second, the value
of capital has absolutely  nothing  to do with past prices. Only the future matters for the value
of capital.  Sunk  costs are sunk.  Third, under some  conditions,  profit maximizing  investors
will choose to equate, at a point in time, the cost of investment  and the value of capital, as
defined here 6. However, this in turn depends  on at least two things: a) a particular  positive
theory of investor  behavior and b) that the incremental  value produced  by the capital good can
be captured  by the owners.  This is why "market" value is in quotes, as I want to have a
"market" value defined even for capital goods that produce  public goods.
Another  concept is the value of a capital good at the prices that would  prevail under the
best set of government  policies (line 5).  These prices are not necessarily  market  prices, as the
best set of policies involves  a variety of empirical  conclusions  about the magnitude  of things
6Moreover,  this equation  of cost of investment  and value of capital will only be true at
a point in time.  Unanticipated  shocks  can potentially  cause large changes in the value of
capital while not changing the (historical)  cost of investment.9
that actually involve  optimal interventions  to force prices away  from market prices:
externalities, learning  spillovers, capital  market constraints,  etc.  As an empirical matter the
actual pattern of prices induced  by the existing set of government  interventions  is highly
unlikely  to be the optimal. The "market" value of capital could be evaluated  at any particular
set of prices; actual prices, at the prices that would  prevail under laissez  faire, prices under
free trade, or at fully "optimal" prices.
Since  the value of capital  depends  on future prices, changes in relative prices will bring
changes in the value of capital goods. Large changes in the value of (private or public)  capital
are possible  after economic  reform, as profit maximizing  investors  will have created a capital
stock that responds  to distorted  price incentives.
Each of the concepts: actual cost of investment,  economic  cost of investment,
constrained  value of capital, market value of capital. and optimal  value of capital, points to a
way in which  the same cost of investment  in the past has created  different amounts  of current
capital.  First, actual costs, especially  of government  investments,  may have been larger that
the economic  cost.  Second, price shifts may have  changed the value of capital relative to its
economic  cost. Third, the constrained  value of capital, again especially  in the public sector,
may be smaller than its maximal  value. Fourth, the market value at prevailing  prices
(including  whatever  distortions  may exist) may be larger than the value of the same physical
capital stock  evaluated  at optimal  prices.
B) The productivity  of canital versus the efficacy  of investment
The distinction  between  the efficacy  of investment  spending  (the ratio of economic  to10
actual cost) in creating capital  and the productivity  of capital is important  particularly  for
understanding  the ability of empirical  work to investigate  the impact  of public  capital on
output. Say we take a simple production  function specification  that distinguishes  private and
public capital  stocks:
. ,
Y = A *K;  *K
Now suppose  that only a fraction  y(.) of public investment  actually  creates useful public
capital 7:
K=  Y(-)  *(IY)  *(YIK)  -0
When this definition  of capital growth is substituted  into the expression  for growth rates of
output the coefficient  on public investment  in the growth equation  is the product of the
production  function parameter  (a.) and the efficacy  of investment  coefficient  y(:
a  =  * (Y(.) *  - 6  8)  + a;  * (;  '-6.)  +A
A growth regression  (or any other empirical procedure) that was limited to observing outputs
and investment  inputs cannot separately  identify  the two effects 8.
7  The usual  perpetual  inventory  methods  simply  assume  that the fraction  of investment
into capital  (y) is 1. For an application  of the approach  to US federal  government  investment
data see Boskin,  Robinson,  and Roberts  (1985).
1 One  way to see this is as a measurement  problem  of capital  stock  growth  because  the
investment  expenditures  are not appropriately  deflated,  which is valued  analytically  as thenI1
This is not an a problem of estimation  of the regression  coefficients  but of their
interpretation. This is not a problem of bias in the estimate of the productivity  of public
capital (ag) but of identification,  which is much more serious.  Bias (or inconsistency)  means
that parameter  estimates  not centered  on its true value, but identification  is means one doesn't
really have an estimate of the parameter  at all.  Assume  that y (the efficacy  of investment)
were fixed across all countries. Then coefficient  on public investment  from a growth
regression  is not a biased estimate of the productivity  of public  capital but rather is a (perhaps
biased) estimate of y*axg.
Of course, the effectiveness  of public investment  y(.) is not a fixed parameter, but
varies across countries  as the the endogenous  outcome  of some process. Assume  the
determinants  of efficacy were known, say for simplicity  it was determined  completely  by some
variable Z.  It is still the case that the regression  of growth on investment  recovers
s(z)  * a  (the output effect of investment evaluated at average efficacy) but not a..  This is
not an issue about omitted variables  bias, as inserting  Z (or some additional  variables  thought
to be related to government  efficicacy)  into the growth regression  does not solve the
identification  problem. This is also not an issue of the specification  of how public capital
enters into the production function,  but of the correct definition  of the growth of public  capital
government  investments  would  simply  be imputed  at their "economic"  not actual  cost. This
however  is not practicable  with the data at hand. First, this is not a matter  of the "price"  of
capital  in the sense of the minimum  price at which  "capital" goods  can be purchased  but the
deviation  of "costs" from  "prices". Second,  since  the efficacy  may  well come in the combination
of factors  the "price" of the inputs  may  be mismeasured.  Third, if we could measure  the "price"
it would  look like  the value in which  case  we wouldn't need to worry about  the price.12
stock.  Even if country specific  efficacy  were completely  observable, a linear regression  of
growth on public investment  and efficacy  (and whatever  other terms) does not recover an
estimate of the productivity  impact  of public capital. Similarly, different production  function
specifications  than the simple Cobb-Doubglas  above, as for instance  entering in public capital
as enhancing  the productivity  of private capital, will not change  the fact that public investment
does not measure public capital growth  and hence cannot be used as its proxy in any form of
production  function  one would  care to postulate'.
An empirical  finding  that "public investment"  is not related to performance  can either
mean that a) countries have over-invested  in public capital so its marginal product (a ,) is very
low or b) that public capital is very productive  but that the average  effectiveness  of public
investment  in creating public capital (y) is very low or c) that public  capital has been created
effectively  but used badly or d) any combination  of the three.  While it is the case that the
coefficient  on investment  gives an estimate  of the average  effect of government  investment
over the particular  sample, if one wants to invest when the returns to investment  are high
(higher  say that than the opportunity  cost of funds) then one needs to know both y and a.  for
the specific  country under consideration  not the average  (that is, unless one chooses to act as if
one is completely  uninformed  about country  conditions).  Moreover, if y is low then the most
desirable  policy  decision may be to attempt  to raise the efficacy before expanding  investment.
Hence, much  of the discussion  about the public sector and its reform is focused  not on the
'  Just because  I use a "Solow"  type production  function for the example,  this is not a
"new" versus  "old" growth  issue or a "spillovers"  verus "direct productivity"  issue or anything
other issue about  the assumed  production  function. One way or another  "public capital"  will
enter the production  function  and this is about what that will look like.13
correct magnitude  of investment,  but around how to change the system of incentives  within the
public sector to increase  effectiveness'°"'.
II.  Minding pD's  and Q's
Most economists' intuition  about capital  are based  on what profit maximizing  investors
do.  Profit maximizing  investors  will be cost minimizers  so that, on average, actual costs will
be equated  with economic  costs. Moreover, if there is a market for capital, this will tend to
equate constrained  with market value (as inefficient  users of capital are bought out or decline
as a share of the market). However, no one believes  that all governments  in the world behave
as profit maximizing  investors  and worse, there is no universally  accepted  positive  theory of
how governments  behave, either as investors  or otherwise.  There are good reasons for this
lack of consensus' 2. I am not going to attempt a positive  theory that attempts  to explain the
'° This common  feature  of focus  on public  sector  incentives  links many  current  strands  of
development  literature,  including:  talk of "governance"  and "accountability,"  the treatment  of
infrastructure  in the 1994  World  Development  Report  (which  focused  on the internal
organization  of infrastructure  providers),  the talk of "reinventing  government"  in the USA
(Osborne  and Gaebler,  1992),  discussions  of participation  as a means of improving  public
performance  (Isham,  Narayan,  and Pritchett,  1995),  estimates  of the relationship  between  returns
on investment  and civil liberties  (Isham,  Kaufmann,  and Pritchett, 1996)  and the work  on the
features  of the public sector  in East  Asia (Campos  and Root, 1996).
"  Distinct  from the "public  sector effectiveness"  literature  is that which  emphasizes
"institutional"  features  that effect both public  and private  investments.  For instance,  the
emphasis  of Olson's (1996)  explanation  of income  level differences  is not so much  on why  there
is no investment  as to why what investment  there has been has not created  economic  growth.
12  Even if it could be assumed  that all government  behavior  could be understood
as the result of the choices  of a unitary actor (which it can't), and even if all those unitary
actor governments  had the same objective  function  (which they don't),  governments  will face
different institutional  arrangements  and hence will differ substantially  in their observed14
cross national  differences  in the efficacy  of investment,  merely point out some examples  of
such behavior.
Venality. Government  officials  often receive  direct money  payments  for the granting of
contracts for investment  projects (or other government  purchases)1 3. To the extent that the
payment  of bribes does not reduce the profits of the supplier, bribes for acquiring the contract
will be part of the cost of investment.  This type of corruption will drives a wedge, B, between
the actual cost of an investment  project (x) and its economic  cost.
C(x)  = EC(x)  + B
B is not just the bribe but all higher costs associated  with the venality  (since the very fact of
concealing  the bribe may create higher costs which do not accrue directly either to the payer
or to the receiver of the bribe). This venality  cost (B) creates a wedge  between the cost of
investment  and the value of capital.  The government  could not sell the newly  created capital
to an investor  for what they paid for it, but at most for its economic  cost.
Lack of government  efficiency  in investment. Even without venality  government
behavior. Crudely put, even if a dictator and an elected president  had as their only objective
personal  enrichment  they would face very different  constraints  in achieving  this objective.
13 1 am not working  out a positive  theory  of corruption,  only the implications  of its existence
for the valuation  of investment. Why it is that, among  its many manifestations,  corruption  takes
the form of a share  of investment  contracts  I can only speculate. There are several  reasons  why
investment  projects  might be a particularly  attractive  source of corruption  opportunities. One is
that the complexity  of the transaction  makes it more  difficult  to identify  the corruption  since in
many cases  the goods  being procured  are unique  it is more  difficult  to assess their fair market
value. Another  is that since investment  contracts  are given out in large  chunks it may  be more
convenient  to extract  the rents at that stage.15
agencies  may be less effective  at cost minimizing  in the creation of capital that the private
sector. This relative efficacy  may well be due to intrinsic  constraints in creating incentives
when the residual claimant  is not well defined. Again, the capital created  by a government
entity could not sell for what it cost to create.
Aid financed investments. Another  set of investments  which are unlikely  to be cost
minimizing  are government  projects financed  by external aid.  In many cases the bilateral
donors  are willing to finance  projects at concessional  rates of particular types  produced  by
export interests in the donor country. In this case the government  may well choose a
substantially  more expensive  project in terms of cost because the net cost to the government  is
lower. Or, alternatively,  the donor's willingness  to finance capital cost may lead the
government  to choose excessively  capital  intensive  projects.  On a deeper incentives  level,
typically  neither the staff of the donor agency nor of the implementing  government  have equity
stakes in their projects so cost minimizing  incentives  are few.  Nevertheless,  in all these cases
the actual, not economic,  cost is recorded  as investment.
Patronage.  Another  example  is when the location and magnitude  of investments  are
subject  of political  considerations  about the conventionally  known  is 'patronage".  This is
different  from the case of venality, in that the government  official  does not directly derive
private benefits and no established  laws or norms are broken. In this case either the amount
spent may well be higher than if resources were allocated  optimally  or characteristics  of the
investment  are different. Again in the case these impacts  are thought to be large as journalistic
accounts  of public sector investment  decisions  (in developed  as well as developing  countries)
over location  are replete with examples  of steel plants far from input sources, factories  far16
from transport, etc.
Poverty  aversion.  Examples  of deviations  of government  decisions  from profit
maximization  need not be "negative." Any deviation  of the government's objective  function
from profit maximization  at market prices will suffice. For instance, one way in which the
government  investment  valued  at cost could differ from its increment  to productive  capital at
market prices is if the government  systematically  pursues projects that benefit the poor.  A
government  may use distributionally  weighted  economic  rates of return rather than financial
rates of return in making investment  decisions. In this case a given increment  of investment
will not produce large increments  to output evaluated  at market prices, but may produce  a
larger increment  to social welfare or equivianently,  to output evaluated  as some set of
"shadow" prices.
This is not to argue that government  investment  is everywhere  and always inefficient.
However, there are difficulties  is structuring  the incentives  of the public sector decision
makers  responsible  for investments  such that they produce  capital. This incentive  problem is
present whenever  ownership  and management  are separate.  However, the public sector does
differ in important  respects from private organizations  in ways that make the problem of
creating  the right incentives  in the public sector qualitatively  more difficult" 4.
14  First,  the state, by definition,  exercises  coercive  power  (e.g., police,  judiciary  and
military)  towards  its citizens. Now while  the use of this power is more or less restricted  through
a variety  of mechanisms  it does imply  that "the state," unlike  a private firm,  necessarily  retains
the ability to extract  investible  funds irrespective  of the investors  (taxpayers)  views of the
profitability  of the capital  to be created.
Second,  because  two entities  claiming  coercive  power  over the same  territory  is called
"war" the state is generally  a monopoly. This intrinsic  monopoly  implies that monitoring  is
difficult  because  of the difficulty  of making  direct  comparisons.  The intrinsic  monopoly  also17
A) The p's and g's of private sector investment  in distorted  environments
From the above section one may have the impression  that if one could separate in the
data private investment  from public investment  then at the least cumulated flows of private
investment  could be used to investigate  the productivity  of private capital.  However, this is
not completely  true, even ignoring  the problems  of agency within the private sector" 5. I'll give
three examples.
Private investments  with government  (or government  guaranteed)  financing.  Often the
public sector lends  money  to agents in the private sector (either directly or through a parastatal
bank). This creates at least three possibilities  for investment-capital  divergence. First, the
government  may  deliberately  subsidize  lending for particular investments  (by sector, by
region). In this case even though the investments  are in the private sector, they have the same
potential  divergence  between  cost and value of capital  as in the patronage case.  Second, in
many cases the financing  provided  by public entities  for "private" investment  was not repaid
and in many of those  cases this defaulr was anticipated  by both borrowers and the lenders.
implies that  new start-ups  are not a viable  mechanism  for responding  to ineffective  states. Hence
management  changes  in many cases  require  the use of force:  hostile takeovers  of governments
tend to be very hostile.
Third,  with governments,  unlike corporations,  the claims  to the residual  value of assets
are not traded. Anyone  disgruntled  with the management  of GM can use an "exit" option and
sell her claim  to someone  else. This provides  a useful  signal and monitoring  of management
performance  at creating  shareholder  value.  Citizenship  on the other hand is typically  not for
sale.  "Voice"  remains  the only option for expressing  discontent  with government's  investment
performance  and the degree  to which  "voice" can be effective  varies
1" In the corporate  sector  managers  benefit more  than shareholders  from certain  types  of
investment  and hence may manipulate  investment. This agency  problem  within corporations  has
received  a great deal of attention  in the business  literature. A recent study suggested  that nearly
all of the investments  of GM over the last decade  did not create any shareholder  value (capital).18
There is no small amount of collusive  behavior  between private individuals  which borrow
from public  entities for "investments"  which are fictitious. Third, when there are public
guarantees  of the depositors  there is a huge incentive  for collusion  between bankers and
borrowers 16.
Private investments  in a distorted environment. The second way in which government
policies  affect the value of private investments  is through  policy distortions. For instance,
when the government  imposes  a tariff and raises the relative  domestic price of a good.  This
potentially  attracts more investment  into that sector than in the absence of the tariff. This
creates a divergence  between the value of the private capital stock at actual and at optimal
relative prices".  If there is subsequently  a reform then the existing capital stock will be
revalued".
Terms  of trade  shocks, creative  destruction,  and revaluations  of investment. The final
16 Akerlof  and Romer  (1993) discuss  a similar phenomena  of private "looting." They
argue that a large fractions  of the loans  given the US S&Ls for instance,  although  they
nominally  were for investments,  were really ways of pumping  money  to S&L owners through
incredibly  risky investments  with low probabilities  of pay-off, but which left losses to be
recovered  by the government.
7  These considerations  are related  to the conceptual  value of capital. In addition  there
are serious  measurement  issues  in the data that are associated  with large distortions. For
instance,  when  exchange  rates  are overvalued  there are incentives  to over-invoice  imports. Since
in many cases  one element  of the estimate  of aggregate  private investment  is the imports  of
capital goods,  this over invoicing  will cause investment  to be overstated.
''  This obviously  has been  a major issue in the transition  in Eastern  Europe. Many large
assets that were geared  to producing  for the centrally  planned  domestic  (and controlled
international)  market  simply  had no value once the price  shifts revalued  the capital. This has the
implication  that after large price shocks  different  vintages  of investment  will have different
impacts  on output,  that is, investments  that were undertaken  as one set of relative  prices will
produce  less  output at those relative  prices  than newer investments  (see below).19
example is simply  that after investments  have been made, shifts in relative prices or
technological  innovation  can either increase  or decrease  the value of any given capital good.
When the price of a commodity  falls then the capital stock associated  with the production of
that commodity  also falls.  Given the dependence  of many economies  on natural resources
which require large, long-lasting,  investments  (such as oil, copper, tin, cocoa, coffee, tea) and
the large fluctuations  in terms of trade, this is empirically important' 9. Similarly, the process
of creative destruction involves  reductions  in the value of existing capital stocks  that embody
old techniques  due to innovation  (Jaffee, 1986). Finally, even though private investors  equate
costs and expected value when investing  the private sector often makes (large) mistakes. The
private sector will have its share of ex post white elephants.
HI) How big is this revaluation  of  effect? Micro evidence
Once the distinction is drawn, the existence  of systematic  differences  between the cost
of public investment  and the value of public  capital seems perfectly  obvious. The key question
is whether this distinction  is conceptually  fruitful and empirically  important  for understanding
the differences  in economic  performance  and for informing  policy recommendations.
How large an effect on recorded  capital stocks  are differences  in the efficacy of
19 In fact, this may  explain the relatively  slower  growth  of the natural  resource  dependent
economies,  conditional  on their rates  of investment  (Sachs  and Warner, 1996). What  looks like
slow TFP growth  at capital stocks  based  on investment  flows  may really  be that massive
investments  made by governments  in resource  extraction  industries  turned out to have very low
returns. One possible  way of getting at this is to examine  the evolution  of the stock  market
valuation  of the equity  of resource  based  firms  as commodity  prices shift. Perhaps  this could
lead to some useful  way to estimate  the revaluation  of capital  impact  of terms  of trade shifts on
Zambia's copper  mines or Bolivia's tin mines or Cote d'lvoire's cocoa plants.20
investment? There are several good reasons to believe  that the magnitudes  are substantial.
However, there is little direct evidence. In particular, the difficulty  is that most evidence links
directly from investment  spending  to some output measure and does not distinguish  amongst
the various reasons; not creating capital, creating the wrong capital, and using capital  badly.
That said, I break the micro evidence into; spectacular  anecdotes, very stylized  facts, and
thought  experiments.
A) Spectacular  anecdotes
The most fun, but least satisfying, evidence  comes from journalistic (and first hand
development  practitioner)  accounts. First, there are herds of white elephants. A nuclear
power plant in the Philippines  cost more than 2 billion dollars but was never commissioned.
As mentioned  in the introduction,  there are steel plants in some  countries in which  billions of
dollars have been poured and have yet to produce any steel.  The World Bank  financed
Morogoro Shoe factory in Tanzania  cost $40 million  but is now a mostly  worthless  hulk,
whose peak capacity utilization  was never more than 4 percent (World Bank, 1991). Since in
many small, poor countries  these large investments  are a substantial  fraction of total
investment, these anecdotes  add up.  Second, there even more spectacular  but less
substantiated  reports in which the estimated fortunes of countries leaders and their cronies
derived from siphoning off, in one form or another, investment  funds that are a significant
fraction of the country's total investment.
B) An eclectic collection  of vea  stylized facts
A first piece of evidence  about differential  public sector effectiveness  is the data on ex21
post economic  rates of return on World Bank investment  projects by country'.  Table 2 lists
the summary  statistics  and some examples. In an African  country the World Bank invested
nearly a billion  dollars in 31 projects and achieved  a median rate of return of 0 (that's zero)!
In contrast the 8.2 billion invested in one East Asia country earned a median return of 19.5
percent. The mean return (of countries  with nine or more projects) was 14.1, but with a
standard  deviation  of 4.2 and a range from 0 to 25.  While this evidence  cannot distinguish  the
causes  of the differences  in returns, there are clearly huge differences  in the efficacy of
governments  in implementing  World Bank financed  projects.
Table 2:  Economic  rates of return on government  investment  projects financed  by the
World Bank.
Number  of  Cumulative  Median ex  post
projects  investment  economic  rate of
(millions)  return
An African  country  31  915  0
A South Asian country  88  19,718  16.5
An East Asian country  41  8,233  19.5
All countries  14.1
Source:  OED database.
While this clearly shows  differentials  in the efficacy  of government  investments,
it does not distinguish  costs particularly. What would be wonderful  is data on the actual costs
on comparable  capital goods across countries. That we don't have. Table 3 reports the dollar
20  The ex  post means  it is after disbursement  of the World  Bank loan. Also, these  are
economic,  not financial  returns  to investment,  so that  they do value non-marketed  outputs,  e.g.
roads.22
cost per kilometer of similar road construction  (in 1985$)  in various countries as taken from
various World Bank  project documents. While some large fraction  of the differences  in costs
is likely accounted  for by technical  differences  (like the location  of the road) it is hard to
believe these differences  in cost do not at all reflect differences  in government  effectiveness.
On the other hand, these particular  differences  are an embrassement  of riches as they seem too
large and too random to entirely be due to differences  in government  efficacy.
Table 3:  Costs of construction  of a kilometer  of similar
















Sri Lanka  65277
Average  287350
Source: Canning and Fay, 1995.
Notes: Brazil and Argentina  were not included  in the high
and low list because of doubts about appropriate  deflation
and exchange  rate conversion  under hyperinflation.
A third piece of evidence, limited  to a single country, is the difference  in returns to23
investments  in manufacturing  in the public versus private sector in India.  Rajaiah  (1989)
compares  the returns on capital employed in private and public  enterprises and finds that over
the 1967/68  to 1973/74  period for which  comparable  data are available, the returns are 4.2 in
the public and 24.9 in the private sector. Even if one limits attention  to the goods producing
public sector firms to account  for the possibly non-commercial  nature of many firms, the
average  return on capital  employed is still 3.9.  Joshi and Little (1994)  use an alternative,
indirect, calculation  using the relationship  between growth rates, investmnent  rates, and capital
shares to calculate the returns to investment  in some sectors in India over the periods 1960-
1975 and 1976-1986. As shown in table 4, they find the return to investment  in public sector
manufacturing  in the latter period was 5.2 percent while the return in private sector
manufacturing  was more than four times higher, at 22.6 percent. Again, this evidence  does
not distinguish  amongst the multiple  reasons why public enterprise profits were lower per
dollar of investment.24
Table 4:  Alternative calculations of the returns to investment in public and private
sectors in India.
Return on capital employed from  Inferred from contribution to growth
firm accounts
Goods  Private  Ratio  Manufacturing
Period:  producing  sector  Private/  Whole
public  Public  public  Public  Private  Ratio
enterprises  sector  private
/public
1960s and  3.9  24.9  6.4  5.4  2.1  11.1  5.3
70s
1976-86  6.2  5.2  22.6  4.3
Source: Rajaiah (1989) from table 3.5 and tables 6.1 to 6.10.  Joshi and Little (1994),
table 13.4, estimates based on adjusted labor quality.
C) A thought experiment
The closest counter-part to the perpetual inventory capital stock at the firm level is the
inflation adjusted, economically depreciated, cumulative investments in the firm.  Imagine
what most public enterprises producing private goods in a competitive environment in most
developing countries would (and do) sell for relative to cumulated investment 2".  This is the
critical thought experiment for distinguishing the "no capital" from the 'badly  used capital"
explanations of the low output from public investments.  That is, if the reason for low output
from publicly operated capital is the difference between the constrained value of capital (when
21  The two qualifications are important: "private good" so that prices really could be
charged and "competitive environment" because many of the most lucrative privatizations are
those that sell monopolies, like telecommunications firms where the price paid for accumulated
assets is difficult to disentangle from the price paid for the exclusive franchise.25
operated ineffectively)  and the market value (when  operated  well) then public firms should sell
for more than their current profit stream. If, on the other hand, the investment  spending  has
not lead to valued assets then the private sector will not pay anything  like book value for the
firms.
Surprisingly  in spite of the spate of privatizations,  this remains a thought  experiment  as
I have not been  able to collect any information  of this type 22. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993)  do report on the value of privatized Russian  firms, which they find to be
extraordinarily  low, so low that they do not believe  the then prevailing prices are good
indications  of future profit streams 23. In East Germany  the net take from privatizing  was
negative  $200 billion, partly because the assets  just were not worth much but primarily
beacause  the new owners had to agree restrictions  on labor (this was a "constrained"  not
"market" value of capital).
22  I suppose  if is naive to be surprised,  as for governments  to admit they  are selling  firms
for a fraction  of what they  paid for them is obviously  embarrassing  and hence best left unstated.
23  They  that at the value  of transactions  (and exchange  rates) of June 1993  the implied
value of the entire Russian  capital  stock was only S10  billion, slightly  smaller than the asset
value of Anheuser-Busch  and slightly  larger than  the Sara Lee corporation. They  argue this is
primarily  not because  the assets will not produce  a profit stream  but because  shareholders  will be
squeezed  out of the profits  by stakeholders  (e.g. managers  and workers).26
IV) How big is this effect?  Macroeconomic evidence
A second way of documenting the discrepancy is to look at the impact of capital
accumulation on growth rates.  I will do so with two methods.
A) Growth. factor accumulation and TFP
Since the distinction between cost of investment and value of capital, while not
unobservable in principle, is unobservable in practice for any largish sample of countries, I
propose instead to work backwards from known data and, by imposing a series of incredible
assumptions, infer the possible magnitude of this effect.
Assume that the evolution of output per worker follows an augmented Solow
production function.  Then with all the usual algebra one can express the growth rate of output
per worker as the growth of physical capital per worker,  human capital per worker and define
the unexplained portion of output growth, which is the growth of the scale factor on the
production function,  as TFP 24. How to interpret TFP is the subject of enormous controversy.
Sometimes TFP is simply "the residual" or "a measure of our ignorance."  Another
interpretation is that the growth of the scale factor on the production function roughly
represents the expansion in the stock of available technical knowledge.  Since measured TFP
in OECD countries is around .5 to 1 percent annum and everyday observation indicates a
24  See Bosworth, Collins, and Chen (1995) for an excellent discussion and
implementation of the various issues involved in this type of "growth accounting" estimate of
TFP.  The regional pattem of their preferred TFP estimates (in spite of the different data, regional
coverage, and time period) are similar to the TFP reported in table 5, SSA -.7, MENA -.4, LAC
.1, OECD 1.0, East Asia .8, South Asia .7.27
substantial amount of technological progress the "stock of knowledge"  interpretation of TFP,
while not necessarily compelling, is not obviously false.
However, in developing countries, fifty-five percent of countries have measured TFP
less than zero, with more than a quarter showing TFP as low as negative one percent per
annum.  This strains the interpretation of the change in the production function scale factor as
the change in the stock of productive knowledge.  These economies are not forgetting one
percent of the stock of knowledge per year.  I would argue a more plausible interpretation is
that the growth of the capital stock in calculating TFP is overstated because of the variety of
investment cost versus value of capital effects discussed above'.  This suggests a calculation
to estimate the magnitude of the deviation of actual creation of the value of productive capital
and capital valued at cost of investment.
*  First, calculate the growth of TFP country by country using reasonable shares for
physical and human capital (since the calculation is obviously crucial but I do not want
to bog down in the details, they are in appendix 1).
*  Second, assume that "true"  TFP growth available to any given economy in the
world is the same, fixed number.  I use either zero (an obvious lower bound) or one
percent per annum (the average in the OECD).  This assumption about TFP will in
some cases be inconsistent with the observed factor accumulation.
25  DeLong and Summers (1991 ) emphasize differences across countries in the price of
investment goods as an important source of mis-measurement of capital stocks.  If prices are
higher in India than in Korea then a greater investment rate (in nominal terms) is required to
produce an equivalent increment to the real capital stock.  The capital stocks used in the base
case are calculated with investment rates that use the investment deflation based on international
comparisons of prices so this effect is already incorporated.28
* Third, I scale back the rate of factor accumulation  to be consistent  with the observed
rate of growth of output per worker and the assumed  TFP.  This creates an estimate of
factor accumulation  I call the "implied" rate of factor accumulation.
In equations  the implied  rate of factor accumulation  (  £ ) is:
k  k  if  TFPŽTFPrx
k  =  y  if  TFP<TFPrX
I carry out three variants on this calculation  using each of the two assumptions  about minimum
TFP.  The first scales back both physical and human  capital, the second scales back  just the
rate of growth physical capital (even when human  capital is still used in calculating  TFP) and
the third assumes  away human  capital entirely.
The results of this calculation  when all factor accumulation  is used in creating TFP and
then scaled  back are reported in table 5.  The results are striking in a number  of ways.  First,
the results suggest  that in many regions the "implied" rate of  factor accumulation  was very
very  much slower than the standard cumulated  investment  capital stocks would  suggest. In
every developing  region (except for East Asia) the implied  rate of factor accumulation  was
only half to three quarters as large as the observed  rate even when TFP (in the sense of
"available" technical  progress) was assumed  to be zero.
Second,  the results are striking in that they accord with my rough intuition  of the
magnitude  of the effectiveness  of public investment. In the OECD and the High Performing29
Asian Economies  (HPAE)  there is very little evidence of deviations  of actual from implied
factor accumulation. Moreover, the problem appears to be worse in precisely  those regions
where one suspected:  the Middle East, (where governments  invested huge oil reflows
combined  with a subsequent  terms of trade shock), Sub-Saharan  Africa, and South Asia.  In
order to know if the pattern of differences  by country roughly  accords with your own notions
of  look in appendix  2 for the country by country results.
Third, there is no relationship  between the magnitude  of actual investments  and the
ratio of implied  to actual growth. The correlation across  countries is only -.19.  Africa, for
instance, both had low investments  and translated  only a small fraction  of that investment  into
capital. The MENA region on the other hand had capital accumulation  as estimated  by
cumulated  investments  growth nearly as large as in the HPAE, but growth of "implied" capital
was quite slow. This suggests  the effectiveness  with which investments  create capital is
potentially  as important  in determining  growth as the magnitude  of investments  itself.
Table  5:  Results  of calculations  of actual and "implied" factor  accumulation
Region  observed  'observed"  if TFP-0  if TFP=I%  p.a.
(number  of countries)  factor  TFP
accumulation  Implied  Implied
Implied  /Observed  Implied  /Observed
Middle  East, North Africa (9)  3.53  -1.3  1.62  100.0%  0.95  26.9%
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (21)  2.03  -0.6  0.99  48.8%  0.17  8.4%
South  Asia (6)  2.13  -0.9  1.15  54.0%  0.19  8.9%
Latin America  and Caribbean  1.69  -0.1  1.22  72.2%  0.41  24.3%
(2 3 )  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
High Performing  Asian  3.84  1.2  3.63  94.5%  3.07  79.9%
Economies (7)
Other Asian  Economies  (4)  1.64  0.3  1.56  95.1%  0.82  50.0%
OECD (24)  1.791  1  1.75  97.8%  1.32  73.7%
Source:  Author's calculations.30
Other variants on this calculation  obviously  give different  results, but the flavor of the
results persists. If one scales back  just physical capital while keeping human  capital in the
TFP calculation,  the results are even more dramatic, with regions like MENA, SSA and South
Asia showing  zero growth contribution  of physical capital accumulation  over the period. On
the other hand, if one assumes  that human  capital  had no effect on output and hence use only
physical capital in creating  TFP and then scales back  just the physical capital, the results are
obviously less  dramatic as fewer countries have negative  TFP.
Table  6:  Results  of calculations  of actual  and  'implied'  factor  accumulation
Region  # of Adjustment  of just  the  physical  capital  Adjustment  of  just physical  capital
countries stock  with  educational  capital  in the  without  education  capital  in the
TFP  calculation  calculatio
Percent  per annum  Implied  Percent  per annum  Implied
growth  /Observed  grw  /Observed
Observed  Implied  Observed I  Implied
Middle  East,  North  9  1.9  0  0.0%  1.58i  0.5  36.7%
Africa  s  j  T  o  _  _  _lS|__37
Sub-Saharan  Africa  21  0.85  -0.19  Negative  0.7  0.45  64.2%
South  Asia  6  0.92  -0.05  Negative  0.76  0.73  96.0%
Latin America  and  23  1.08  0.61  56.5%  0.89  0.7  78.6%
Caribbean  _
High Performing  Asian  7  3.03  2.82  93.1%  2.5  2.5  100.0%
Economies
Other  Asian Economies  4  1.19  1.09  91.6%.  0.98  0.98  100.0%
OECD  24  1.36  1.32  97.1%  1.12  1.11  99.1%
This calculation  itself is of course not "proor  of the mis-measurement  of capital stock
growth, it simply  states the implications  of reversing  the interpretation  of slow growth from
"low TFP in spite of capital  accumulation"  to "mismeasured  capital accumulation." In spite
of the fact that nearly  all previous  TFP calculations  have taken perpetual inventory  capital
stocks  at face value, there is no logical  or theoretical  grounds on which to insist that the capital31
stock estimates  are correct. This is particularly  the case for the public sector.
Correlations  with some indicator  of "government" or "policy" performance  might be
helpful in distinguishing  amongst  interpretations  of the data.  Recently  Sachs and Warner
(1995)  have proposed an indicator  of overall policy that combines  a binary indicator  of
whether or not a government  is repressive  and a binary indicator of a minimum  amount  of
"openness"  and those non-repressive  and open governments  are classified as having an
acceptable  policy  environment. Table 7 shows  the difference  in the observed  versus implied
capital stock growth by whether  or not regimes were politically  repressive. The average
observed  rate of growth of the capital stock was almost identical  between the two sets.
However, the "implied" rate of factor accumulation  is 86 percent of the observed  for the
politically  non-repressive  economies  but only 50 percent for the repressive  governments.
Moreover, not only is the difference  between  observed and "implied" lower but the variance
of the difference  is much higher for repressive  regimes 26. So while some repressive  regimes
might be effective  at creating  capital, others are very very ineffective. The evidence  is
suggestive  that the problem of low returns on investment  is related to issues of governance,  in
the broad sense of government  efficacy, not just economic  policy.
26  The difference  between  repressive  and non-repressive  is robust  whether  one excludes
Africa  (mostly  classified  as repressive)  or the OECD  (non-repressive)  from the calculations.32
Table 7:  Ratio of observed  to implied  factor accumulation,  across types of
countries.
Percent per annum  growth  Standard
Country  # of  factor accumulation  Ratio  deviation  of
classification  countries  Observed  Implied  the
E  ~~~~difference
Non-  56  2.14  1.84  86.0%  0.69
repressive  _  _  _
Repressive  38  2.18  1.08  49.5%  1.9
Acceptable  28  2.27  2.15  94.7%  0.46
policies
Bad policies  66  2.1  1.27  60.5%  1.56
Sources:  Sachs and Warner, 1995 for classification  of countries.
B) Results of growth regressions
The second way to illustrate  the implications  of assuming  capital is mismeasured  at the
macroeconomic  level is to estimate a growth model  that distinguishes  private from public
investment. We specify  two typical growth regressions,  one of which is a simple  growth
accounting  exercise that regresses growth  on (potentially  endogenous)  investment  rates and
another of which combines  investment  variables with other, policy  control variables. (The full
regressions  are reported in appendix  3)27.
27  Hulten  (1996)  does similar  regressions  within the context  of a extended  Solow model
in which  the coefficients  on public and private  investment  are treated  as production  function
parameters.33
Table 8:  Growth regression  based estimates  of the relative returns to private and
public investnent.
Without  policy controls  With policy controls
Private  Public  Private  Public
Coefficient  .223  .115  .222  .093
(t-statistic)  (6.41)  (2.82)  (6.29)  (2.09)
Share of GDP  10.9  8.9  11.0  8.9
Implied  relative  62.5%  51.2%
effectiveness  of public
investment
Notes: The implied  relative effectiveness  is the ratio of government  investment  that passes
into public  capital growth if the returns to capital  on private and public capital are equal.
The returns are estimated  as the growth coefficient  divided by the estimated  capital-output
ratio for each type of capital, which is the relative investment  shares times 2.5.
How is the difference  in coefficients  of private and public investment  to be interpreted?
Certainly  one possibility is that the productivity  of public  capital is lower and another
interpretation  is that the public sector uses its capital less effectively. An equally plausible
interpretation  is that the impact  of public  capital on output is large, but that the effect of public
investment  on public  capital is small. If we assume that public  capital's share in output is
proportional  to its share in total investment  then we can use the estimated  coefficient  to infer
the average  relative effectiveness  of public investment. The estimates  derived from this
approach  reported in table 8, of between 50 and 60 percent. These accord remarkably  well
with the estimates  from the TFP approach  when TFP is assumed  to be zero.34
V) Relationship  to previous literature  and policy implications
Since all of the previous literature has relied on either on expenditures  or cumulative
investment  flows this critique leads to fundamentally  different interpretations  of the results.
Rather than drawing inferences  from estimates  about the effect  of public  capital (or the optimal
effect of any kind of expenditure)  as if one were recovering  estimates  of a "production
function" it is equally or more plausible that the results reflect differences  in efficacy across
countries, especially  when countries  with extremely  different types of governments  are
included  in the same analysis.
A) Empirical  literature  on government  spending  and performance
Growth  and government  spending. The literature on government  spending  and growth
can be classified  into four strands.
One estimates  the impact  of the level of total government  expenditures  or government
consumption  expenditures  on growth. Some Ram (1986), Kormendi  and Meguire (1985) find
higher larger government  expenditures  associated  with higher growth while other studies such
as Landau (1986), Barro (1991), and Dowrick  (1992) find higher government  expenditures
associated  with lower growth while Levine and Renelt (1992)  show that goverrnent
expenditures  is not a robust (partial) correlate  of growth.  Differences  in variable definition
and econometric  technique  appear to account  for the differences  in results 2 . and more serious
23  The definition  of the variable  for the government  expenditures  in the growth  regression
as either  the share  of government  spending  (G/Y)  (generally  negative  findings)  or the growth  of
government  spending  G*(G/Y)  (generally  positive findings)  appears  to make huge difference.
Dowrick  (1992)  argues  that an upward  simultaneity  bias from higher income  growth  leading  to
more government  growth  accounts  for the positive  coefficients.35
question is exactly what these estimates  of partial correlations  between government
expenditures  and growth performance  are actually identifying.
Slemrod (1995) has argued that if all governments  are choosing  the level of
expenditures  optimally  then the interpretation  of the coefficient  of level of expenditures  on
growth is problematic. I am making almost  the opposite  point. Govermments  are not choosing
either the level of expenditures  or their productivity  with anything  like the same degree of
optimality  with respect to some growth or welfare related objective  function.  Governments
face very different  constraints and there is no reason to expect the impact  of public investment
to be uniform across countries  of different  types.
The second strand of the literature  examines the impact  of the magnitude  and
composition  of government  investment spending  on growth.  Easterly and Rebelo (1993)  have
four empirical findings  relevant  to the present  paper. First, government  investment  overall has
a very low impact  on growth 29. Second, investment  of the central government  has a much
larger growth impact  than investments  of public  enterprises. This finding  is consistent with an
observation  that the control over public enterprises is even worse than over central
government. Third, they find that across sectors, only investment  in transport and
communications  has any growth impact30.  This finding  on the impact  of transport is supported
by the results of Canning  and Fay (1995)  who find a strong relationship  between  physical
29  This confirms  the finding  by Landau  (1986)  for the 1960-80  period  that government
capital  expenditures  as a share  of GDP are not associated  with higher growth.
30  On the other hand Baffes  and Shah  (1993) find very low output elasticities  of
"infrastructure  capital"  from perpetual  inventory  estimates  in a time series  trans-log  production
for 25 countries,  but with a large variation  across  countries.36
stocks  of roads and growth 3l.  Fourth, they find that it is difficult  to identify  any negative
effect of the level (or structure) of taxation  on growth.
The third strand examines the impact of the allocation of government spending (not just
investment)  on growth 32. Devarajan,  Swaroop  and Zhou (1996) find:
All of the standard  candidates  for productive  expenditure--capital,  transport and
communication,  health, and education--  had either a negative  or insignificant
relationship  with economic  growth.
These authors recognize  the important  issue is whether public  expenditures  increase  public
capital.
The fourth strand estimates  the impact  of public  capital from time series.  If
governments  differed in the efficacy  of their investments  one would expect these estimates  to
be very different for different  countries. Unfortunately  there are few good estimates  of the
productivity  of public capital  and what few there are are of limited  comparability 33. But what
studies  there are show huge differences  across  economies, with estimates  in Mexico  of the
return to public capital between  5 and 7 percent (versus 14 to 18 for private capital) (Shah,
1992)  while estimates  are 77 percent in Taiwan, China and 51 percent in Korea (Uchimura  and
Gao, 1993).
3' This points up the possibility  of attempting  to estimate  the efficacy  paramneter  directly
by relating  changes  in physical stocks  (e.g. miles of roads)  to expenditures.
32  There is another  strand  which looks  at the specific  component  of government
spending:  military  spending. This literature  finds sometimes  positive  (Landau,  1994)  sometimes
negative  (Knight,  Loayza,  and Villanueva,  1995)  growth  effects  depending  on the specification
of the possible  non-linearities  and the endogeneity  of spending  to actual threats.
33 I'll ignore  the whole literature  in the USA and the debate between  Aschauer  (1989),
who  finds returns  around 60 percent and Holtz-Eakin  (1992) who  finds returns around  0.37
Recent  results about the growth impact  of concessional  assistance  are also relevant. If
aid finances  government  projects and particularly  does so in climates in which government
investment  is not particularly  productive,  then a finding  an impact  of aid financing  on growth
not significantly  different  from zero is not particularly  surprising (even if it were to expand
aggregate  government  investment)34.
Sectoral  outcomes  and spending. In addition  to the growth literature, many have
examined  the impact  of expenditures  in the education  and health sectors on outcomes  in those
sectors. Generally,  after controlling  for the overall level of income, there is no evidence  of an
impact  of government  spending. In health, Murray, Govindaraj, and Musgrove  (1994)  find no
link between  life expectancy  and the fraction  of GDP spent  on health care 35. In education,
there is no link between  educational  spending  per pupil and comparisons  on internationally
comparable  examinations  (Elley, 1992).  Neither Landau  (1986) and Hanushek  (1996)  find
any connection  between educational  spending  and economic  growth.
All of the typically  negative  or ambivalent  findings  on government  investment  (or
spending)  are potentially  a reflection  of differences  in investment  efficacy. One cannot
conclude from the fact that educational  expenditures  may fail to have the expected  magnitude
(and even perhaps  to even be statistically  insignificant)  that increased  education  does not raise
34  This is different  from the rationale  presented  in Boone  (1994),  which is that aid
financing  does  not expand  investment.
35  Anand  and Ravallion  (1993)  do find a positive  effect,  but in a very limited  sample  of
22 quite poor  countries. The very high correlation  of GDP per capita  and "Public  Health
Spending  Per Person"  in their data of .91 makes the separate  identification  of the two effects
problematic  in both cases.38
output. The regression  only tells the output impact  of additional  expenditures  at the average
efficacy  of the sample.
B) Giving sensible  policy advice
The main policy implication  is that in order to give sensible advice about government
investments  we need country specific  information. In contemplating  a recommendation  for
government  investment  something  like the decision  tree in figure I might be helpful (although
this is highly stylized). There are three main points from the figure.  First, policy
recommendations  will be country specific. Recommending  that Chile not build roads because
TIanzania's  experience  was disastrous is as wrong as its opposite.
Second, most of the answers  necessary  for policy making  are primarily  analytical  and
only secondarily  empirical. We need to know on analytical  grounds what is the desirable
scope for government action 3 6. The empirically observed returns to public enterprises are not
the crucial feature, the question  is how the economy  would  have performed in the absence  of
the public enterprises, which depends  on views about the degree of private sector
responsiveness. Also, the appropriate  incentives  for effective  public sector supply  are an
analytic question  and the answer will vary from country to country  and from sector to sector.
Third, comparisons  across countries  will have to be very much finer than our current
data allow to be useful.  Comparing  spending  on this or that and performance  across countries
36 The private returns to education  computed  from wage surveys or the "cost-
effectiveness"  of particular medical interventions  are as irrelevant  to government  investment
spending  as are the returns on the stock market.39
does not help distinuish  any of critical branching points for policy recommendations.
Conclusin
Nearly all of the recent spate of work on the empirics  of growth that has investigated
the impact  of various types of government  spending has operated, implicitly  or explicitly,
under the assumption  that the same  positive model of government  behavior  held for all
countries. While this may be a reasonable  assumption  for countries with similar economic  and
political  structures, it is obviously  false in general. This implies  that inferences  about the
impact  of government  spending from a group of countries  to a specific  country or from one
country to another are invalid.
This paper has presented  empirical  results which suggest this distinction  has important
implications  not only for our understanding  of the existing literature but also for policy advice.
The fact that government  investments  of various types may or may not be associated  with
economic  performance  is an interesting  fact but by itself provides little useful information  for
policy  recommendations  to particular  countries. Instead there is an entirely different  set of
questions  for policy, that intrinsically  depend  on assessments  of the capacity  of the
governments  and private sectors as well as an assessment  of the analytical  and empirical
grounds for public intervention.40
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Appendix 1:  Calculation  of observed  factor accumulation,  TFP, and implied.
Equations. The formulas  are quite simple, one begins with a Cobb-Douglas  production
function in labor, physical capital and human  capital with a scale factor that implies  neutral
technical  progress.
Y  =AQ)*K  *H  *L  '
Impose constant returns to scale, so that
ak  +  cch  +a  =  I
Normalize  to the growth of output per worker and take logs and differentiate  with
respect to time and the following  equation is a definition  of TFP:
a  =  ,k *k  +a *h  +TFP
where lower case with dots is the percentage  rate of change  of per worker quantities. All of
the calculations  are done with the per annum rate of change  estimated  with a least squares
trend over the entire period of data availability  (generally 1960  to the late 1980s).
Data.  To empirically  implement  the above equation  one needs  data on the four items
that enter the equation, GDP, physical  capital stock, human capital  stock, and labor force.
For each of those quantities  I have two data sources, which are described in the table below.
All of the results in the paper, unless  otherwise  specified  are based  on the set of data in the
first column (Summers-Heston,  King-Levine,  Barro-Lee)  but all calculations  were also
performed  using the set in the second  column (World  Bank, Nehru-Dhareshwar,  Nehru-
Swanson-Dubey),  with roughly  similar results overall. The correlation between  the two TFP
growth rate series is .77.44
Appendix  table A1.1: Description  of data sources for TFP calculations
Variable  Data collection  1: Summers-  Data collection  Il:  World Bank.
Heston, King-Levine.  Barro-Lee.  Nehru-Dharesewar,  Nehru-
Swanson-Dubey.
GDP  Source: Summers  and Heston,  Source: World Bank  data
1991, Penn World Tables, Mark 5
Description:  Real GDP  Description:  Real GDP in local
(RGDPCH)  expressed in  currency, constant prices.
purchasing  power equivalents.
Labor Force  Penn World Tables, Mark 5  Penn World Tables, Mark 5
Physical  Capital  Source: King and Levine (1994)  Source: Nehru and Dhareshewar
Stocks  (1993)
Capital stock  series in P$ based on  Capital stock series in constant
a perpetual  inventory  cumulation  US$ based on a perpetual
of the investment  rates in the  inventory  cumulation  of
PWT5 from an estimate  of the  investment  rates in the World
initial capital stock in 1960.  Bank  National Accounts  data.
Human Capital  Source: Barro and Lee 1993  and  Source: Nehru, Swanson,  and
Pritchett, 1996.  Dubey, 1993 and Pritchett 1996.
Description:  The underlying  data  Description:  The underlying  data
on years of schooling  of the adult  on years of schooling  of the
population  ( > 25 years) are  labor force aged population
computed  by Barro and Lee based  (> 15 years) are computed by N-
in Census reports of educational  S-D based on a perpetual
attainment  and enrollment  rates.  inventory  cumulation  of
Pritchett (1996)  calculates  the  historical  enrollment  rates
human capital  stock based on the  (adjusted  for repetition, drop
years of schooling  from assumed  out). Pritchett (1996)  calculates
returns to schooling.  the human  capital stock based on
the years of schooling  from
assumed  returns to schooling.
Parameters. The final items needed  for the TFP calculations  are the shares  of physical
and human  capital. For the calculations  in this paper I assume that the capital share ak is .4,
the labor share is .6 and that half the labor return is human  capital, so the human  capital  share45
ah is .3.  I could go into great length justifying these particular values, but any reasonable set
of parameters will produce quite similar results,  especially in terms of patterns across
countries. (There is one point, which is that one of the major implications of this paper is that
the regression estimates of these parameters will be biased.  In particular,  one previous finding
of mine is that the regression estimated value of human capital is very near zero (Pritchett,
1996) even though the national accounting value must be somewhere around  .3.)
B)  Data  sets
This presents the exact same calculations are reported in table 5 in of the text using
completely different data sets.  The same basic results come through, especially the low in
Africa and Latin America and high in the OECD and HPAE.  Similarly, if the cross tab
calculations by the political or policy indicators similar results appear with the two datasets.
Appendix table A1.2:  The same calculations as in table 5 with another data set
for growth, capital, and education.
Region  # of countries  Adjustment of all factor accumulation (Physical and
Human Capital)
Percent per annum growth  Implied
Observed  Implied  /Observed
MENA  9  3.47  2.43  70.0%
SSA  20  2.38  0.36  15.1%
South Asia  4  1.96  1.89  96.4%
LAC  18  1.73  1.15  66.5%
HPAE  5  4.32  4.13  95.6%
SE Asia  2  1.95  1.8  92.3%
Pacific  I  __  1_T  _  92.3_%
OECD  23  1.71  1.68,  98.2% 46
Appendix  2: Country  by country  results, growth.  TFP,  "implied" factor accumulation
Name  Growth  of  TFP  Actual  Implied  Ratio
GDP  Factor  Factor  Implied  to
Per worker  Accum.  Accum.  Actual
South  Asia
NPL  1.6%  -3.8%  5.4%  1.6%  29.69
IND  1.1%  -0.8%  1.9%  1.1%  57.9%
LKA  1.0%  -0.7%  1.7%  1.0%  58.8%
BGD  1.0%  -0.3%  1.3%  1.0%  76.9%
AFG  0.6%  0.0%  0.6%  0.6%  100.0%
PAK  1.8%  0.2%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
Other  Asia
PHL  2.3%  0.2%  2.1%  2.1%  100.0%
PNG  1.4%  0.0%  1.5%  1.4%  93.3%
MMR  2.2%  0.6%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
FJI  1.4%  0.6%  0.8%  0.8%  100.0%
Reg.  Average(Both)  1.4%  -0.4%  1.9%  1.3%  69.2%
LAC
HTI  0.8%  -2.2%  3.1%  0.8%  25.8%
NIC  -0.5%  -1.9%  1.4%  -0.5%  0.0%
GUY  -1.9%  -1.9%  0.0%  -1.9%  0.0%
SLV  0.2%  -1.6%  1.8%  0.2%  11.1%
PER  0.8%  -0.6%  1.4%  0.8%  57.1%
JAM  0.2%  -0.5%  0.7%  0.2%  28.6%
CHL  0.1%  -0.3%  0.4%  0.1%  25.0%
CRI  1.4t  -0.3%  1.7%  1.4%  82.4%
VEN  1.5%  -0.2%  1.7%  1.5%  88.2%
URY  1.0%  -0.1%  1.1%  1.0%  90.9%
ARG  1.2%  -0.1%  1.3%  1.2%  92.3%
TTO  2.1%  0.3%  1.8%  1.8%  100.0%
HND  1.7%  0.1%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
DOM  2.3%  0.0%  2.3%  2.3%  100.0%
BRA  3.3%  1.8%  1.5%  1.5%  100.0%
ECU  3.3%  1.1%  2.2%  2.2%  100.0%
BOL  1.6%  0.5%  1.1%  1.1%  100.0%
PRY  2.9%  0.5%  2.4%  2.4%  100.0%
COL  2.3%  1.1%  1.1%  1.1%  100.0%
PAN  3.1%  0.9%  2.2%  2.2%  100.0%
MEX  1.9%  0.1%  1.8%  1.8%  100.0%
GTM  2.0%  0.0%  1.9%  1.9%  100.0%
BRB  1.9%  0.6%  1.3%  1.3%  100.0%
Average  1.4%  -0.1%  1.6%  1.1%  72.6%
Sub-Saharan  Africa
MOZ  -2.3%  -3.7%  1.3%  -2.3%  0.0%47
MLI  0.8%  -3.3%  4.0%  0.8%  20.0%
ZAR  0.1%  -2.7%  2.8%  0.1%  3.6%
CAF  0.3%  -2.6%  2.8%  0.3%  10.7%
TGO  2.4%  -2.6%  5.0%  2.4%  48.0%
GHA  -0.6%  -2.0%  1.4%  -0.6%  0.0%
ZMB  -1.5%  -1.9%  0.3%  -1.5%  0.0%
SEN  -0.5%  -1.3%  0.8%  -0.5%  0.0%
SLE  0.9%  -1.2%  2.1%  0.9%  42.9%
UGA  -0.7%  -1.2%  0.5%  -0.7%  0.0%
LBR  0.0%  -0.9%  0.9%  0.0%  0.0%
SWZ  3.2%  0.2%  2.9%  2.9%  100.0%
ZAF  1.8%  0.4%  1.3%  1.3%  100.0%
LSO  6.1%  2.4%  3.7%  3.7%  100.0%
KEN  2.1%  0.7%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
NER  0.4%  0.4%  0.0%  - 0.0%  0.0%
TZA  2.8%  1.0%  1.8%  1.8%  100.0%
MUS  1.6%  0.1%  1.5%  1.5%  100.0%
BWA  8.0%  3.1%  4.9%  4.9%  100.0%
MWI  1.8%  0.0%  1.8%  1.8%  100.0%
ZWE  2.4%  1.9%  0.5%  0.5%  100.0%
Average  1.4%  -0.6%  2.0%  0.9%  44.8%
MENA
KWT  -8.3%  -10.3%  2.0%  -8.3%  0.0%
IRQ  2.1%  -3.3%  5.4%  2.1%  38.9%
JOR  3.1%  -1.8%  4.9%  3.1%  63.3%
IRN  2.7%  -1.3%  4.0%  2.7%  67.5%
ISR  2.9%  1.4%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
SYR  4.7%  1.1%  3.6%  3.6%  100.0%
TUN  2.9%  0.1%  2.8%  2.8%  100.0%
DZA  4.5%  0.8%  3.7%  3.7%  100.0%
TUR  3.5%  1.0%  2.5%  2.5%  100.0%
Average  3.3%  -0.3%  3.5%  2.7%  83.7%
OECD
NZL  0.4%  -0.6%  1.0%  0.4%  40.0%
SWE  1.6%  0.6%  1.0%  1.0%  100.0%
CAN  1.4%  0.4%  1.0%  1.0%  100.0%
USA  1.1%  0.1%  1.0%  1.0%  100.0%
PRT  3.4%  0.7%  2.7%  2.7%  100.0%
JPN  5.1%  2.2%  2.9%  2.9%  100.0%
NLD  2.1%  0.7%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
DEU  2.5%  1.3%  1.2%  1.2%  100.0%
NOR  2.6%  0.8%  1.8%  1.8%  100.0%
ESP  3.2%  1.1%  2.1%  2.1%  100.0%
FIN  3.0%  1.6%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
BEL  2.4%  1.1%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
ISL  2.2%  1.0%  1.2%  1.2%  100.0%
MLT  4.9%  3.3%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
ITA  3.6%  1.9%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
DNK  1.7%  0.8%  1.0%  1.0%  100.0%48
FRA  2.8%  0.8%  2.0%  2.0%  100.0%
GBR  1.8%  0.6%  1.2%  1.2%  100.0%
AUT  3.4%  0.8%  2.5%  2.5%  100.0%
CHE  1.4%  0.0%  1.4%  1.4%  100.0%
GRC  4.4%  1.7%  2.7%  2.7%  100.0o
AUS  1.6%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  100.0%
CYP  3.8%  2.2%  1.6%  1.6%  100.0%
IRL  2.6%  0.9%  1.7%  1.7%  100.0%
Average  2.6%  1.0%  1.6%  1.6%  97.5%
HPAE
IDN  4.7%  -0.8%  5.5%  4.7%  85.5%
HKG  4.7%  2.8%  1.9%  1.9%  100.0%
MYS  3.5%  0.5%  3.0%  3.0%  100.0%
SGP  4.8%  1.8%  3.0%  3.0%  100.0%
THA  3.7%  1.3%  2.4%  2.4%  100.0%
KOR  5.5%  1.4%  4.1%  4.1%  100.0%
TWN  5.7%  1.7%  4.0%  4.0%  100.0%
Average  4.7%  1.2%  3.4%  3.3%  97.9%49
Appendix  table 3.1: Growth  regressions  for investment  coefficients
Dependent  variable:  Per capita growth  rate (in percent), World Bank  data, decades  by decade.
Without  'policy" variables  With 'policy'  variables
Constant  .33  3.9
(.884)  (1.65)
In Initial Income  -0.42  -.82
(1.17)  (2.25)
Private Investment  22.3  22.3
(6.41)  (6.29)
Consolidated  public  sector  11.5  9.35
investment  (2.82)  (2.09)
Primary Enrollment  rate  -.19  1.0
(.20)  (1.03)
Secondary  Enrollment  rate  2.0  .3
(1.49)  (.203)
Dummy  for 1960s  3.1  2.49
(5.78)  (4.32)
Dummy  for 1970s  2.3  2.1
(6.08)  (5.97)
Dummy  for Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.2  -1.5
(2.42)  (2.90)
Dummy  for LAC  -1.6  -1.68
(3.54)  (3.53)
Ratio M2/GDP  2.2
(2.01)
Government  Consumption/GDP  -8.4
(2.41)
N (obs)  162  136
Adjusted  R2  .485  .551
Source:  Data is from Easterly  and Rebelo, 1993.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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